Abstract. This article consider Massey's construction for constructing linear secret sharing schemes from toric varieties over a finite field Fq with q elements. The number of players can be as large as (q − 1) r − 1 for r ≥ 1. The schemes have strong multiplication, such schemes can be utilized in the domain of multiparty computation.
• ⊆ M R = M ⊗ Z R -an integral convex polytope.
• X = X -the toric variety associated to the polytope .
• T = T N = U 0 ⊆ X -the torus.
• H = {0, 1, . . . , q − 2} × · · · × {0, 1, . . . , q − 2} ⊂ M .
1. Introduction 1.1. Secret sharing. Secret sharing schemes were introduced in [3] and [26] and provide a method to split a secret into several pieces of information (shares) so that any large enough subset of the shares determines the secret, while any small subset of shares provides no information on the secret.
Secret sharing schemes have found applications in cryptography, when the schemes has certain algebraic properties. Linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS) are schemes where the secrets s and their associated shares (a 1 , . . . , a n ) are elements in a vector space over some finite ground field F q . The schemes are called ideal if the secret s and the shares a i are elements in that ground field F q . Specifically, if s,s ∈ F q are two secrets with share vectors (a 1 , . . . a n ), (ã 1 , . . .ã n ) ∈ F n q , then the share vector of the secret s + λs ∈ F q is (a 1 + λã 1 , . . . , a n + λã n ) ∈ F n q for any λ ∈ F q .
The reconstruction threshold of the linear secret sharing scheme is the smallest integer r so that any set of at least r of the shares a 1 , . . . , a n determines the secret s. The privacy threshold is the largest integer t such that no set of t (or fewer) elements of the shares a 1 , . . . , a n determines the secret s. The scheme is said to have t-privacy.
An ideal linear secret sharing scheme is said to have multiplication if the product of the shares determines the product of the secrets. It has t-strong multiplication if it has t-privacy and has multiplication for any subset of n − t shares obtained by removing any t shares.
The properties of multiplication was introduced in [10] . Such schemes with multiplication can be utilized in the domain of multiparty computation (MPC), see [6] , [2] , [5] and [11] .
Toric varieties and secret sharing.
In [14] , [15] and [16] we developed methods to construct linear error correcting codes from toric varieties and derived the code parameters using the cohomology and the intersection theory on toric varieties. In [17] we utilized the method and the results to construct quantum codes.
Massey's construction of linear secret sharing schemes from error-correcting codes [22] also applies to our codes on toric varieties. In a certain sense our construction resembles that of [7] , where LSSS schemes were constructed from Goppa codes on algebraic curves, however, the methods to obtain the parameters are completely different.
The linear secret sharing schemes we obtain are ideal and the number of players are q r − 1 for any positive integer r. The classical Shamir scheme only allows q − 1 players, however, there are methods to allow schemes with more players using linear codes [8] , this article presents such a method.
The schemes are obtained by evaluating certain rational functions in F q -rational points on toric varieties.
The thresholds and conditions for strong multiplication are derived from estimates on the maximum number of zeroes of rational functions obtained via the cohomology and intersection theory on the underlying toric variety. In particular, we focus on toric surfaces.
We present examples of linear secret sharing schemes which are quasi-threshold and have strong multiplication [10] with respect to certain adversary structures.
Specifically, for any pair of integers a, b, with 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ q − 2, we produce linear secret sharing schemes with (q − 1)
2 − 1 players which are quasi-threshold, i.e., the reconstruction threshold is at most 1 + (q − 1)
2 − (q − 1 − a) and the privacy threshold is at least b − 1. The schemes have t-strong multiplication with respect to the threshold adversary structure if
For the general theory of toric varieties, we refer to [23] , [13] and [9] .
2. Preliminaries 2.1. Linear Secret Sharing Schemes. This section presents basic definitions and concepts pertaining to linear secret sharing schemes as introduced in [22] , [10] , [7] and [8] .
Let be F q be a finite field with q elements. An ideal linear secret sharing scheme M over a finite field F q on a set P of n players is given by a positive integer e, a sequence V 1 , . . . V n of 1-dimensional linear subspaces V i ⊂ F e q and a non-zero vector u ∈ F e q . An adversary structure A, for a secret sharing scheme M on the set of players P, is a collection of subsets of P, with the property that subsets of sets in A are also sets in A. In particular, the adversary structure A t,n consists of all the subsets of size at most t of the set P of n players, and the access structure Γ r,n consists of all the subsets of size at least r of the set P of n players.
For any subset A of players, let V A = i∈A V i be the F q -subspace spanned by all the V i for i ∈ A.
The access structure Γ(M) of M consists of all the subsets B of players with u ∈ V B , and A(M) consists of all the other subsets A of players, that is A / ∈ Γ(M). A linear secret sharing scheme M is said to reject a given adversary structure A, if A ⊆ A(M). Therefore A ∈ A(M) if and only if there is a linear map from F e q to F q vanishing on V A , while non-zero on u.
The scheme M works as follows. For i = 1, . . . n, let v i ∈ V i be bases for the 1-dimensional vector spaces. Let s ∈ F q be a secret. Choose at random a linear morphism φ : F e q → F q , subject to the condition φ(u) = s, and let a i = φ(v i ) for i = 1, . . . , n be the shares
Then
-the shares {a i = φ(v i )} i∈A determine the secret s = φ(u) uniquely if and only if A ∈ Γ(M), -the shares {a i = φ(v i )} i∈A reveal no information on the secret s = φ(u), i.e., when A ∈ A(M).
Definition 2.1. Let M be a linear secret sharing scheme. The reconstruction threshold of M is the smallest integer r so that any set of at least r of the shares a 1 , . . . , a n determines the secret s, i.e., Γ r,n ⊆ Γ(M).
The privacy threshold is the largest integer t so that no set of t (or less) elements of the shares a 1 , . . . , a n determine the secret s, i.e., A t,n ⊆ A(M). The scheme M is said to have t-privacy. Definition 2.2. An ideal linear secret sharing scheme M has the strong multiplication property with respect to an adversary structure A if the following holds.
1. M rejects the adversary structure A . 2. Given two secrets s ands. For each A ∈ A, the products a i ·ã i of all the shares of the players i / ∈ A determine the product s ·s of the two secrets.
Linear secret sharing schemes with multiplication on tori
In [14] , [15] and [16] we introduced linear codes from toric varieties and estimated the minimum distance of such codes using intersection theory. Our method to estimate the minimum distance of toric codes has subsequently been supplemented, e.g., [18] , [29] , [19] , [24] , [1] , [20] [28], and [21] .
Linear secret sharing schemes obtained from linear codes were introduced by James L. Massey in [22] and were generalized in [8, Section 4.1]. A scheme with n players is obtained from a linear C code of length n + 1 and dimension k with privacy threshold t = d − 2 and reconstruction threshold r = n − d + 2, where d is the minimum distance of the code and d the minimum distance of the dual code.
We utilize the Massey construction to obtain linear secret sharing schemes from toric codes.
Under certain conditions the linear secret sharing schemes from toric codes have the strong multiplication property.
3.1. The construction. Let M Z r be a free Z-module of rank r over the integers Z.
For any subset U ⊆ M , let F q < U > be the linear span in
r ] of the monomials
. . , u r ) ∈ U } . This is a F q -vector space of dimension equal to the number of elements in U .
Let T (F q ) = (F * q ) r be the F q -rational points on the torus and let S ⊆ T (F q ) be any subset. The linear map that evaluates elements in F q < U > at all the points in S is denoted by π S :
The toric code is the image C = π S (F q < U >) and we obtain a the linear secret sharing scheme from C by the Massey construction.
Definition 3.1. Let S ⊆ T (F q ) be any subset so that P 0 ∈ S. The linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS) M(U ) with support S and n = |S| − 1 players is obtained as follows:
• Let s 0 ∈ F q be a secret value. Select f ∈ F q < U > at random, such that
• Define the n shares as
The main objectives are to study privacy, reconstruction of the secret from the shares and the property strong multiplication of the scheme as introduced in Definition 2.1 and Definition 2.2.
In order to present the general theory for the linear secret sharing schemes M(U ) above, we make some preliminary definitions and observations. 3.1.1. Translation. Let U ⊆ M be a subset, let v ∈ M and consider the translate v + U := {v + u| u ∈ U } ⊆ M .
Lemma 3.2. Translation induces an isomorphism of vector spaces
We have that
i) The evaluations of π T (Fq) (f ) and π T (Fq) (f v ) have the same number of zeroes on T (F q ).
ii) The minimal number of zeros on T (F q ) of evaluations of elements in F q < U > and F q < v + U > are the same. iii) For v = (v 1 , . . . , v r ) with v i divisible by q − 1, the evaluations π S (f ) and π S (f v ) are the same for any subset S of T (F q ).
The lemma and generalizations has been used in several articles classifying toric codes, e.g., [18] .
An immediate consequence of iii) above is the following corollary, which also can be found in [24, Theorem 3.3] .
Corollary 3.3. Let U ⊆ M be a subset and let
3.1.2. Orthogonality -dual code. In Proposition 3.5 we present the dual code of C = π S (F q < U >).
Let U ⊆ M be a subset, define its opposite as −U := {−u| u ∈ U } ⊆ M . The opposite maps the monomial X u to X −u and induces by linearity an isomorphism of vector spaces
, we have the inner product
Lemma 3.4. Let f, g ∈ F q < M > and assume f =ĝ, then
With this inner product we obtain the following proposition, e.g.
Theorem 3.6. Let r(U ) and t(U ) be the reconstruction and privacy thresholds of M(U ) as defined in Definition 2.1.
Then
for some f ∈ F q < U > and for some g ∈ F q < −H \ −U > , where
Proof. The minimal distance of an evaluation code and the maximum number of zeros of a function add to the length of the code.
The bound for r(U ) is based on the minimum distance d of the code
, the bound for t(U ) is based on the on the mini-
, using Proposition 3.5 to represent the dual code as an evaluation code.
The codes have length |T (F q )|, hence,
The results follow from the construction of Massey [22, Section 4.1].
Of interest is to consider the coset distance that is greater than or equal to the minimum distance, which has been used in [12] to estimate the parameters of secret sharing schemes coming from Algebraic-Geometry codes.
Theorem 3.7. Let U ⊆ H ⊂ M and let U + U = {u 1 + u 2 | u 1 , u 2 ∈ U } be the Minkowski sum. Let
The linear secret sharing schemes M(U ) of Definition 3.1 with n = (q − 1) r − 1 players, has strong multiplication with respect to A t,n for t ≤ t(U ), where t(U ) is the adversary threshold of M(U ), if t ≤ n − 1 − (the maximal number of zeros of π T (Fq) (h)) for all h ∈ F q < U + U >.
Proof. For A ∈ A t,n , let B := T (F q ) \ ({P 0 } ∪ A) with |B| = n − t elements. For f, g ∈ F q < U >, we have that f · g ∈ F q < U + U >. Consider the linear morphism
evaluating at the points in B.
By assumption h ∈ F q < U + U > can have at most n − t − 1 < n − t = |B| zeros, therefore h cannot vanish identically on B, and we conclude that π B is injective. Consequently, the products f (P ) · g(P ) of the shares P ∈ B determine the product of the secrets f (P 0 ) · g(P 0 ), and the scheme has strong multiplication by definition.
To determine the product of the secrets from the product of the shares amounts to decoding the linear code obtained as the image in (3.1).
Toric surfaces and linear secret sharing schemes with strong multiplication
Let M Z 2 be a 2-dimensional lattice and assume that U = M R ∩ consists of the integral points of a 2-dimensional integral convex polytope in M R = M ⊗ Z R. Let N = Hom Z (M, Z) be the dual lattice with canonical Z-bilinear pairing < , >: M × N → Z.
The support function h : N R → R is defined as h (n) := inf{< m, n > | m ∈ } and the polytope can be reconstructed from the support function
The normal fan ∆ is the coarsest fan so that h is linear on each σ ∈ ∆, i.e., for all σ ∈ ∆ there exists l σ ∈ M so that
Upon refinement of the normal fan, we can assume that two successive pairs of n(ρ)'s generate the lattice and we obtain the refined normal fan. The 1-dimensional cones ρ ∈ ∆ are generated by unique primitive elements n(ρ) ∈ N ∩ ρ so that ρ = R ≥0 n(ρ).
Let k = F q be an algebraic closure of F q . The 2-dimensional algebraic torus T N k * ×k * is defined by T N := Hom Z (M, k * ). The multiplicative character e(m) for m ∈ M is the homomorphism
Specifically, if {n 1 , n 2 } and {m 1 , m 2 } are dual Z-bases of N and M and we denote u j := e(m j ), j = 1, 2, then we have an isomorphism T N k * × k * sending t to (u 1 (t), u 2 (t)). For m = λ 1 m 1 + λ 2 m 2 we have e(m)(t) = u 1 (t) λ1 u 2 (t) λ2 .
The orbits of this action are in one-to-one correspondence with ∆. For each σ ∈ ∆ let orb(σ) := {u : M ∩ σ → k * |u is a group homomorphism} .
Define V (σ) to be the closure of orb(σ) in X . A ∆-linear support function h gives rise to a polytope and an associated Cartier divisor
where ∆(1) consists of the 1-dimensional cones in ∆. In particular For a ∆-linear support function h and a 1-dimensional cone ρ ∈ ∆(1) the intersection number (D h ; V (ρ)) between the Cartier divisor D h of (4) and V (ρ)) = P 1 is obtained in [23, Lemma 2.11] . The 1-dimensional cone ρ ∈ ∆(1) is the common face of two 2-dimensional cones σ , σ ∈ ∆(2). Choose primitive elements n , n ∈ N so that n + n ∈ Rρ
In the 2-dimensional non-singular case let n(ρ) be a primitive generator for the 1-dimensional cone ρ. There exists an integer a such that n + n + an(ρ) = 0, V (ρ) is itself a Cartier divisor and the above determines the self-intersection number (V (ρ); V (ρ)) = a . Figure 1 and with refined normal fan depicted in Figure 2 . The related toric surface is called a Hirzebruch surface.
We obtain the following result as a consequence of Theorem 3.6 and the bounds obtained in [16] on the number of zeros of functions on such surfaces. Let M(U ) be the linear secret sharing schemes of Definition 3.1 with support T (F q ) and (q − 1) 2 − 1 players. Then the number of lattice points in is
The maximal number of zeros of a function f ∈ F q < U > on T (F q ) is Remark 4.4. The polytope −H \ −U is not convex, so our method using intersection theory does not determine the privacy threshold t(U ). It would be interesting to examine the methods and results of [18] , [29] , [19] , [24] , [1] , [20] [28], and [21] for toric codes in this context.
4.2.
Toric surfaces with associated linear secret sharing schemes with strong multiplication. Let a, b be positive integers 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ q − 2, and let be the polytope in M R with vertices (0, 0), (a, 0), (b, q − 2), (0, q − 2) rendered in Figure 3 and with normal fan depicted in Figure 4 .
Under these assumptions the polytopes , −H \ − and + are convex and we can use intersection theory on the associated toric surface to bound the number of zeros of functions and thresholds.
The primitive generators of the 1-dimensional cones are
, n(ρ 4 ) = 0 −1 .
For i = 1, . . . , 4, the 2-dimensional cones σ i are shown in Figure 4 . The faces of σ 1 are {ρ 1 , ρ 2 }, the faces of σ 2 are {ρ 2 , ρ 3 }, the faces of σ 3 are {ρ 3 , ρ 4 } and the faces of σ 4 are {ρ 4 , ρ 1 }.
The support function of is:
The related toric surface is in general singular as {n(ρ 2 ), n(ρ 3 )} and {n(ρ 3 ), n(ρ 4 )} are not bases for the lattice M . We can desingularize by subdividing the cones σ 2 and σ 3 , however, our calculations will only involve the cones σ 1 and σ 2 , so we refrain from that.
For all pairs of 1-dimensional cones ρ i , ρ j ∈ ∆(1), i = 1, . . . , 4, the intersection numbers (V (ρ i ); V (ρ j )) are determined by the methods above, however, we only need the self-intersection number (V (ρ 1 ); V (ρ 1 )), and as
we have that Let M(U ) be the linear secret sharing schemes Definition 3.1 with support T (F q ) and n = (q − 1) 2 − 1 players.
i) The maximal number of zeros of π T (Fq) (f ) for f ∈ F q < U > is less than or equal to
ii) The reconstruction threshold as defined in Definition 2.1 satisfies
iii) The privacy threshold as defined in Definition 2.1 satisfies
The secret sharing scheme has t-strong multiplication for
Proof. Let m 1 = (1, 0). The F q -rational points of T F q * × F q * belong to the q − 1 lines on X given by
Assume that f is zero along precisely c of these lines.
As e(m 1 ) − η and e(m 1 ) have the same divisors of poles, they have equivalent divisors of zeroes, so (e(m 1 ) − η) 0 ∼ (e(m 1 )) 0 .
This implies that c ≤ a according to Lemma 4.1. On any of the other q − 1 − c lines the number of zeroes of f is at most the intersection number
This number can be calculated using Lemma 4.2 using the observation that (e(m 1 )) 0 = V (ρ 1 ).
We get from (4.1) and (4.2) that
As 0 ≤ c ≤ a, we conclude the total number of zeroes for f is at most
proving i). According to Theorem 3.6, we have the inequality of ii)
We obtain iii) by using the result in i) on the polytope (q−2, q−2)+ −H \− with vertices (0, 0), (q − 2 − b, 0), (q − 2 − a, q − 2) and (q − 2, q − 2). The maximum number of zeros of π T (Fq) (g) for g ∈ F q < −H \ −U > is by Lemma 3.2 and the result in i) less than or equal to (q − 1)
2 − (q − 1 − (q − 2 − b)) = (q − 1) 2 − 1 − b and iii) follows from Theorem 3.6.
To prove iv) assume t ≤ (q − 2 − 2a) − 1 and t ≤ b − 2. We will use Theorem 3.7.
Consider the Minkowski sum U + U and let V = U + U be its reduction modulo q − 1 as in Corollary 3.3. Under the assumption 2a ≤ q − 2, we have that V = U + U is the lattice points of the integral convex polytope with vertices (0, 0), (2a, 0), (2b, q − 2) and (0, q − 2).
By the result in i) the maksimum number of zeros of π T (Fq) (h) for h ∈ F q < V > is less than or equal to (q − 1)
2 − (q − 1 − 2a). As the number of players is n = (q − 1) 2 − 1, the right hand side of the condition (3.7) of Theorem 3.7 is at least (q − 2 − 2a) − 1, which by assumption is at least t.
By assumption t ≤ b − 1 and from iii) we have that b − 1 ≤ t(U ). We conclude that t ≤ t(U ). 
